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Participation Rights of Preferred Stockholders
By L. L. Briggs
The terms of a preferred-stock contract may provide that after 
payment of the preferred dividend the holders of this stock may 
be entitled to share equally with the common stockholders in any 
further dividends that may be declared or that they may share in 
dividends declared after the holders of the common stock have 
received a dividend equal to that of the preferred. The preferred 
certificate may also prohibit further participation in profits after 
the holders have received their stipulated dividend.
When there is no provision at all in the preferred contract in 
regard to the disposition of earnings left after the preferred stock­
holders are paid their contractual dividend, misunderstandings 
may arise because the contract may be interpreted as limiting 
these shareholders to this amount or it may be interpreted as not 
having such a limitation. Most of the corporate instruments 
merely state that certain shareholders shall be entitled to a speci­
fied preferential dividend and contain no provision as to what shall 
be done with the balance of the surplus earnings available for 
distribution as dividends.
Some writers on corporation law and the leading legal encyclo­
pedias state that unless the corporate instruments provide other­
wise, preferred and common stockholders participate equally in any 
distribution of profits after both the preferred and the common 
shareholders have received a dividend equal to that provided 
for in the preferred contract. A careful study of the court deci­
sions on the point leads me to the conclusion that this is not an 
accurate statement of the law in all jurisdictions. It is the rule 
that is followed in some states but it is not the law in others. The 
point is still unsettled in a majority of the states because it has 
not come before their highest courts. So far as I have been able 
to determine, the supreme court of the United States has never 
had occasion to rule upon it.
A review of the cases on this point discloses the existence of two 
distinct and conflicting rules both of which are broad enough to 
include any case where the corporate instruments contain no 
provision about participation of preferred stockholders in surplus 
profits. Some jurisdictions permit participation after the 
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common stockholders have received a dividend equal to the pre­
ferred while others do not allow such a division of the corporate 
profits.
Pennsylvania has taken the most definite stand in the matter 
and the decisions in that state clearly hold that the preferred 
shareholders may share, pro rata, with the holders of the common 
stock when excess profits are distributed. The case of first im­
pression, Fidelity Trust Company v. Lehigh Valley Railway 
Company, was to the effect that all shares are equal except for the 
preference stated and that preferred stockholders have all the 
ordinary incidents of shareholders together with any preference 
specifically given. For three years the common stockholders had 
received a dividend equivalent to the ten per cent paid to the 
preferred and the remaining surplus available for dividends was 
divided equally between the common and the preferred at the 
same rate per share on the par value. Later, however, the surplus 
was not large enough to pay the ten per cent cumulative dividend 
on the preferred, and when a sufficient surplus became available 
the question arose as to whether the excess paid above the amount 
of the preference for the three early years could be charged 
against the preferred arrears of subsequent years. The court 
decided that it could not be so charged, on the ground that what 
the preferred had received in the way of dividends with the 
common in excess of its ten per cent was a legitimate distribution 
of profits. Citing no authority the court said that “when each 
class of stock had been paid ten per cent., they were equal, and 
equally entitled to distribution of whatever remained in the fund 
applicable to dividend purposes.”
Sternbergh v. Brock is the next Pennsylvania decision in regard 
to preferred participation rights. According to its facts, the 
preferred stockholders, from 1899 until 1907, received their 
stipulated dividends and no more, while all profits above these 
amounts were distributed to the common shareholders who 
received less than two per cent on the par value of their stock but 
more than five per cent on the amounts which they actually had 
paid. In March, 1907, a quarterly dividend of two per cent (a 
rate of eight per cent a year) was declared on both the preferred 
and the common stock. Sternbergh, a common stockholder, filed 
a bill in equity and claimed that the preferred stockholders were 
entitled to only five per cent. The contract had no participation 
provision. The lower court denied the injunction on the author-
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ity of the Fidelity decision and the case was appealed. In stating 
the opinion of the higher court, Justice Potter said:
“Where there is no stipulation in the contract to the contrary, 
the weight of authority clearly favors the right of preferred 
stockholders to share with the common stockholders in all profits 
distributed, after the latter have received an amount equal to the 
stipulated dividend on the preferred stock. In the absence of 
special provisions, the holders of preferred stock in a corporation 
are in precisely the same position, both with respect to the 
corporation itself and with respect to the creditors of the corpora­
tion, as the holders of common stock, except only that they are 
entitled to receive dividends on their shares, to the extent guar­
anteed or agreed upon, before any dividends can be paid to the 
holders of common stock.”
The supreme court of Pennsylvania, therefore, affirmed the 
decision of the lower court.
In Englander v. Osborne, the plaintiff’s decedent owned shares 
of six per cent cumulative preferred stock in a corporation. No 
dividends were paid on either the company’s preferred or common 
stock until 1917, a period of nine years, when a dividend of fifty- 
four per cent., covering the current year and all arrearages, was 
declared and paid on the preferred, and at the same time a divi­
dend of an equal amount was declared on the common. The 
plaintiff brought an action to restrain the payment of the latter 
dividend on the ground that the holders of common stock were not 
entitled to a dividend of more than six per cent without sharing 
the excess equally with the preferred shareholders. On the other 
hand, the defendants claimed that the holders of common stock 
were entitled to receive dividends to an amount sufficient to make 
up arrearages in past years and to equalize the common and pre­
ferred stock before the holders of the latter were entitled to receive 
an excess above the amount of their fixed dividends and arrearages. 
The lower court restrained the payment of the dividend on the 
common stock, and the defendant appealed. In giving the opin­
ion of the higher court, Justice Frazer made the following state­
ment:
“We find nothing limiting the right of the preferred stockhold­
ers to the six per cent dividend, regardless of the earnings of the 
company, and in the absence of such limitation the general rule 
is that such stockholders are entitled to share with the holders of 
the common stock all profits distributed after the latter have 
received in any year an amount equal to the dividend on the 
preferred stock. The priority of the preferred stockholders rests 
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upon the contract, and beyond the provisions of such contract 
they occupy no position toward the company different from that 
of the holders of common stock. When a dividend is declared, 
the former are entitled to share to the extent of their preference 
for the current year, and if there remains a sum more than suffi­
cient to pay a similar dividend on the common stock, both classes 
are entitled to share equally in the excess. In the absence of 
agreement, expressed or implied, that dividends shall be cumula­
tive, unpaid dividends in the past can not be claimed.”
The supreme court concluded that the above principles had 
been properly applied by the lower court and consequently 
affirmed its decision.
Indiana seems to be the only other state clearly in line with 
Pennsylvania on this point. In Star Publishing Company v. Ball, 
the supreme court of that state, speaking through Justice Town­
send, said: “The preferred stockholder is just as much a party to 
this venture as the common stockholders, and is entitled to all the 
rights of the common stockholders, except as modified by statute 
and contract.” After dividends are paid on the common stock 
equal to those received by the preferred under their contract, the 
preferred may participate in additional dividends to any amount.
In a Georgia decision, Coggeshall v. Georgia Land and Investment 
Company, there is a dictum which conforms to the Pennsylvania 
rule. In this decision, Judge Wade said:
“Preferred stock takes a multiplicity of forms but usually 
possesses certain distinctive characteristics. The dividend may 
be either cumulative or non-cumulative; and unless the contract 
provides otherwise, preferred stockholders participate in the 
surplus profits, after the preferred dividend has been declared on 
the preferred stock, and an equal dividend on the common stock.”
In an early English case, the house of lords held that after 
discharging all debts and liabilities and repaying to the ordinary 
and the preference shareholders the capital paid on their shares, 
the assets ought to be divided among all the shareholders in 
proportion to the shares held. This means, of course, that 
preferred shareholders would participate equally with the 
common in any surplus profits in the hands of the company.
Another English decision contains this dictum in the words of 
Justice Swinfen Eady:
“There is not any rule of law that shareholders having a fixed 
preferential dividend take that only. It is quite open to a com­
pany to distribute its revenue first in paying a fixed preferential 
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dividend; then in paying a dividend of like amount to the ordinary 
shareholders; and then dividing any surplus revenue of the year 
ratably between the preference and the ordinary shareholders.”
The latest English decision in point involves a company liquida­
tion. In this it was held that where there is nothing in the articles 
to modify or to exclude the normal right of the preference share­
holders to share in the distribution of the surplus assets, they were 
entitled to rank, pari passu, with the ordinary shareholders in 
such distribution. Justice Eve made the statement that:
“Nothing is said as to the distribution of any assets still re­
maining for distribution after the capital has been repaid, but in 
the absence of any provision to the contrary these assets—the 
joint result produced by the employment of capital contributed 
by both classes of shareholders—ought to be shared by the 
contributors.”
Now let us consider the status of stock dividends from the 
standpoint of preferred participation. If the voting control of 
the corporation is undisturbed and the right to share in assets 
upon dissolution is not impaired, and there is no contract to the 
contrary, the preferred may participate in stock dividends as well 
as in cash distributions under the Pennsylvania rule. In Sterling 
v. Watson, the voting cumulative preferred stock could be retired 
at the option of the corporation upon the payment of par value 
and accrued and unpaid dividends. Eight years after a twenty- 
five per cent common stock dividend had been distributed 
equally to both common and preferred stockholders, the company 
decided to retire the preferred and sought to deduct the par value 
of the stock dividend from the total amount due to the preferred 
stockholders under their contract. The court denied the right 
to make this deduction on the grounds that the contract meant 
that the preferred dividends must be in cash and that the pre­
ferred shareholders were entitled to participate with the common 
in the stock dividend on the authority of the Fidelity Trust and 
Sternbergh decisions. According to Justice Elkin:
“When the preferred dividends are paid, and dividends out of 
the net earnings from year to year of an equal amount have been 
declared and paid on the common stock, then all of the stock, 
common and preferred, has the right to participate in the dis­
tribution of the surplus earnings upon an equal basis. . . . The 
principle is sound and maintained by the great weight of au­
thority.”
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The original and generally accepted understanding in business 
and financial circles is that after the preferred stockholders get 
their specified dividend they are not entitled to participate, and 
if the rest of the profits are paid out by the corporation in the form 
of dividends such distributions go entirely to the common stock­
holders. This is usually called the English rule.
The first time that the question of preferred participation rights 
appeared before the American courts was in Scott v. Baltimore and 
Ohio Railroad Company. According to the report of this case, the 
preferred certificates provided that the holders should be entitled 
to such dividends as the directors might declare “up to, but not 
exceeding, four per centum before any dividends shall be set apart 
or paid upon the common stock.” A preferred stockholder 
claimed the right to participate in the whole of the surplus re­
maining after payment of the preference or, failing in that, the 
right to participate in so much of the surplus as remained for 
dividends after the common stock had received a dividend equiva­
lent (whether as to rate or amount was not stated in the opinion) 
to that received by the preferred. The court denied both rights 
upon the ground that, if the words “not exceeding” did not limit 
the dividend rights of the preferred stock—if these words did not 
mean that the holders of preferred stock were entitled to four per 
cent and to no more in any circumstances—then the words were 
meaningless.
The plaintiff in this case contended that the whole purpose 
of the certificate was to declare what the preferred shareholders 
were entitled to before the common stockholders were entitled to 
anything. The language of the certificate is ambiguous, to say 
the least. It might be taken to mean that no more than four per 
cent should be paid to the preferred either before or after any 
dividends should be set apart or paid on the common, or it might 
mean that no more than four per cent should be paid to the 
preferred until that amount had been paid to the common. 
Under the first construction, the words “not exceeding” would 
limit the total amount and under the second there would be no 
such limitation.
If the express terms of the preferred contract with the corpora­
tion, as evidenced by the stock certificate, allocate surplus earn­
ings as a fund out of which such dividends as may be declared 
must be paid on stock other than the preferred, preferred stock­
holders are not entitled to participate in surplus earnings in addi­
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tion to the amount specified in their contract with the corporation. 
This was the decision in a Virginia case in which the court said:
“Our conclusion, then, is that there is no error in the decree, 
and that the preferred stockholders . . . are limited to five per 
cent dividends in any fiscal year, and can not participate further 
in the surplus net profits for such year because by their contract 
they have expressly accorded to all of the other stockholders the 
paramount and hence exclusive right to have dividends therefrom, 
subject only to the legal and proper discretion of the board of 
directors.”
In Keith v. Carbon Steel Company, the court held that a holder 
of non-cumulative six per cent preferred stock, who had received 
his preference dividend in full, was not entitled to restrain the 
corporation from paying accumulated earnings amounting to 
nearly half its capital exclusively to the common. According to 
District Judge Orr:
“The holders of preferred stock must be deemed to have been 
unwilling to take the same risks as the holders of the common were 
willing to take. In other words, they were not willing to take 
their certificates without an expression thereon of the amount 
which they were entitled, respectively, to receive out of the 
profits. . . . We are unable to see why, in contracts such as these 
before us, the expression of the amount to be received under the 
contract should not be deemed to be an exclusion from the minds 
of the parties of any additional amount. ... A certificate of 
stock does not ordinarily express the share of the profits which a 
stockholder shall receive from the corporation, and therefore the 
law implies a term in the agreement that the holder of such 
certificates shall share equally in the profits set apart by the 
management for the payment of dividends. There can be no 
implication, however, where the contract expressly states the 
percentages which one contracting party is to receive from 
another.”
In two early English decisions are judicial dicta to the effect that 
profits set apart by directors for depreciation, insurance and im­
provements go to the ordinary shareholders exclusively, although 
there are preferred shares entitled to a preferential dividend of five 
per cent. The court made this statement: “It is generally as­
sumed that where the preference shares are given a fixed prefer­
ential dividend at a specified rate that impliedly negatives any 
right to take any further dividend, and probably this assumption 
is well founded.”
In Will v. United Lankat Plantations Company, the view is 
taken that a cumulative preference is a limitation of the total 
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amount. In other words, preferred stockholders are denied the 
right of participation. According to the facts, the holders of ten 
per cent cumulative preferred stock had prior rights over the 
common as to capital and dividend. The company sold part of 
its business for cash and 45,000 fully paid shares of the purchasing 
company. It paid ten per cent to the preferred stockholders and 
distributed the shares to the common. A preferred stockholder 
sued to have the distribution declared illegal on the ground that 
the preferred should share, pari passu, with the common in excess 
of ten per cent on both classes. This case is unique as one 
of first impression in England. According to Cozens-Hardy, 
master of the rolls:
“It is remarkable that, although preference shares have been 
known for so many years, . . . and although during all those 
years preference shares . . . have been well known and dealt 
with in millions, not an instance has been called to our attention 
in which the claim now set up has been called to our attention.”
Justice Joyce of the chancery division allowed the contention of 
the plaintiff, but the court of appeals unanimously reversed the 
lower court and expressly held that in the absence of any con­
trary provision in the statute or contract the preferred was entitled 
to only the stipulated dividend. On appeal, the house of lords 
unanimously affirmed this decision.
The decision in the Will case apparently is based upon the 
court’s interpretation of the contract, and the following statement 
occurs in Palmer’s Company Precedents: “It is generally assumed 
that where the preference shares are given a fixed preferential 
dividend at a specified rate that impliedly negatives any right to 
take any further dividend, and probably this assumption is well 
founded.” Lord Haldane said: “Shares are not issued in the 
abstract and priorities then attached to them uno flatu, and when 
you turn to the terms on which the shares are issued you expect 
to find all the rights as regards dividends specified in the terms of 
the issue, and when you do find these things prescribed it cer­
tainly appears to me unnatural to go beyond them, and look to the 
general provisions of an article which is only to apply if nothing 
different is said.” Cozens-Hardy, master of the rolls, declared: 
“One can not be aware to any extent of what goes on in the stock 
market without knowing that preferential shares of stock are 
ordinarily spoken of and regarded, and I think properly regarded, 
as shares of stock which carry a fixed preferential dividend and are 
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entitled to nothing more.” According to Lord Justice Farwell: 
. the birth of preference shares limits in its very inception 
the whole of its attributes. It has a preference, and such a prefer­
ence as is given to it by the resolution, and no more; and I should 
have said that ever since I have been at the bar, or have had 
anything to do with company matters, that has always been 
perfectly well understood.”
In the case of Collaroy Company, Limited v. Giffard, the articles 
provided that “the preference shares shall confer the right to a 
fixed cumulative preferential dividend. . . .” The court decided 
that the use of the term “the right” instead of “a right” showed 
conclusively that it was not intended that the preferred shares 
should have any right other than the preference.
Canada apparently follows the English rule. In Ramsay v. 
Steel Company of Canada, Limited, Justice Orde said:
“Where the preference shares, duly created and issued, are 
declared to be entitled to a fixed cumulative preferential dividend 
at a certain rate per annum, any further participation in the profits 
of the company is impliedly negatived, and if the right to any 
further participation is to be granted it must be distinctly so 
stated.”
Cases involving participation rights of preferred shareholders in 
stock dividends should also be reviewed.
Niles v. Ludlow Valve Manufacturing Company is the first 
decision in point. According to the facts, 4,000 shares of stock 
were preferred as to eight per cent, dividends and as to capital. 
In addition, the holders of this stock were entitled to equal voting 
power with the holders of 3,000 shares of common stock. The 
statutes of New Jersey, the state of incorporation, provided that 
the preferred stock should be entitled to a fixed yearly dividend of 
eight per cent., to be paid before any dividend could be declared 
on the common stock. Over a period of two decades, in nearly 
every year, a larger dividend was paid upon the common stock 
than upon the preferred, but the holders of the latter stock made 
no protest. The stockholders, common and preferred, authorized 
the board of directors to distribute from surplus a 100 per cent 
dividend of common stock to the holders of the common shares. 
A holder of preferred, who did not vote for the measure, claimed 
the right to share in the dividend and sought to enjoin the dis­
tribution of it unless the holders of the preferred shares should be 
allowed to participate. The lower court dismissed the bill. It 
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interpreted the statutes to mean that the preferred shareholders 
were entitled to eight per cent, and no more and held that the 
remainder of the surplus available for dividends belonged to the 
holders of the common stock alone. In affirming the judgment, 
the circuit court of appeals, speaking through Judge Coxe, said:
“The common shareholders bear substantially all the losses of 
adversity and are entitled to the gains of prosperity. A contract 
that they should assume all the risk with no corresponding ad­
vantage should be clearly established. We find nothing in the 
law or the certificate or in the past action of the defendant (the 
corporation) to indicate that anyone connected with the business 
supposed that the preferred stockholders were to share equally 
with the common stockholders in the division of surplus earnings.”
Circuit Judge Ward gave the following strong dissenting opin­
ion in the Niles case:
“The general principle is that all stockholders share equally in 
net profits, except as their relations are altered by statute or con­
tract. If the preference is given to one class of stockholders over 
the rest, it should be construed consistently with this general 
principle so far as possible. For instance, if the preferred stock­
holders are given the right to receive a dividend of a fixed amount 
before the common stockholders get anything, the latter should 
receive an equal amount, and then the surplus, if any, be equally 
divided between the preferred and the common stockholders. 
Where the privilege is intended to be restrictive, the restriction 
should be expressed, as by saying that the preferred stockholders 
are to be paid a certain dividend before the common stockholders 
get anything and are to receive nothing more. In this case the 
certificate of the company provided that the preferred stock­
holders should be paid an annual cumulative dividend of eight 
per cent before the common stockholders received anything. 
There were no words of restriction. Therefore I think that they 
were entitled to receive their proportion of the stock dividend in 
question. It is true that the dividends had for many years been 
declared and paid as if the privilege to the preferred stockholders 
were restrictive, the question never having been raised, but I 
think this does not prejudice the rights of the preferred stock­
holder who now for the first time raises the question.”
In Stone v. United States Envelope Company, a common stock­
holder sought to restrain a corporation from distributing equally 
between the common and preferred shareholders a stock dividend 
representing earnings employed for improvements, claiming that 
as the preferred had been paid in full, all remaining profits be­
longed solely to the common. According to the facts of the case, 
the United States Envelope Company had outstanding 40,000
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shares of seven per cent, cumulative preferred stock and 10,000 
shares of common, with equal voting power. All of these shares had 
been issued except 2,500 shares of common, which the corporation 
proposed to sell at $150 a share to the holders of both classes of 
stock. This price was less than the value of the stock. Stone, a 
common shareholder, requested an injunction to restrain the 
company from selling this stock to the preferred, on the ground 
that such a sale would have the effect of a dividend. The court 
refused to allow the preferred to share in the purchase of this 
stock and thus receive a dividend from the surplus profits of the 
difference between the value of the stock and its selling price, on 
the ground that the ordinary buyer of preferred shares buys with 
the understanding that the maximum of his right to share in 
dividends is fixed by the fact of preference and at the amount of 
the preference. According to Justice Deasy: “We put the 
decision, however, upon the ground that, where nothing to the 
contrary appears, the creation of the preferred stock prima facie 
implies that the preferential rights of the (preferred) shareholders 
are given in lieu of and to the exclusion of the equality of par­
ticipation which would otherwise exist.” After discussing the 
Pennsylvania rule, the court said: “The other theory which we 
believe to be better and supported by the weight of authority is 
that in receiving the greater security of his preferential rights, the 
preferred impliedly agrees to accept such rights in lieu of equal 
participation.” Justice Deasy then continued with these words: 
“Independent reasoning as well as what we deem to be the 
preponderance of authority sustains the plaintiff’s position. 
Words in contracts, as well as in statutes, should ordinarily be 
construed ‘according to the common meaning of the language.’ 
Surely the phrase ‘preferred stock’ holds out to the ear of the 
ordinary investor no promise of participation in earnings beyond 
his preferential dividend. That this is true has been recognized 
by the authorities.” Hence, preferred stockholders, against the 
objection of common stockholders, can not be given a pre­
emptive right the same as common stockholders to purchase 
common stock from the corporation at a price less than the value, 
since this in effect would be an additional dividend to the pre­
ferred stockholders.
According to the facts of Tennant v. Epstein, 356 Ill. 26 (1934), 
the plaintiff held common stock in an Illinois corporation which 
had outstanding shares that were preferred as to assets on dis-
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solution and as to dividends to the extent of seven per cent. 
Under the constitution of Illinois each stockholder, common or 
preferred, is entitled to one vote for each share held. The board 
of directors voted a dividend of common stock, one share for each 
common and each preferred share outstanding. This stock was 
issued and subsequently a cash dividend was paid on all common 
stock which, of course, included the stock received as a dividend. 
The plaintiff asked the cancellation of the stock dividend and the 
repayment of the cash dividend, and the court granted his request. 
It seemed that the purpose of the stock dividend was to create 
a right to additional cash dividends in the holders of the preferred 
stock. Consequently, holders of preferred stock, which is limited 
by certificate to dividends of a specified percentage, are not 
entitled to participate in a stock dividend because such dividend 
is an indirect way of distributing cash surplus.
According to the facts of Borg v. International Silver Company, 
the defendant corporation proposed to issue treasury stock to 
both preferred and common stockholders at $50 a share, when the 
par was $100 and the book value probably was more, as the com­
pany had accumulated a substantial surplus. The court said: 
“If it is true—and it appears not to be disputed—that the corpora­
tion has a substantial surplus to which the preferred stockholders 
would not be entitled in the event of dissolution, then the action 
of the directors in making an offer which results in the preferred 
stockholders’ getting a major portion of the proposed issue at 
fifty per cent of its par value, would seem to work an injustice to 
the common stockholder.” The injunction was granted. The 
rule permitting the preferred stockholders to participate was 
denounced by the court on the ground that it is unfair to the 
holders of the common stock who should not be forced to assume 
a much greater risk than the preferred holders with no better 
chance for gain.
In Riverside and Dan River Cotton Mills v. Branch, a surplus was 
to be distributed in the form of voting shares to the common stock­
holders. The court decided that the preferred shareholders were 
entitled to participate in stock dividends beyond the amount of 
their preference, even though their right to dividends was limited 
to the preference given. It reasoned that, if the shares were in­
creased and the preferred holders were not allowed to participate, 
the value of their rights upon dissolution would be decreased. 
Since the preferred had equal voting power with the common, an 
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increase in the number of shares would decrease the proportionate 
strength of the preferred stockholders in the control and manage­
ment of the corporation if they were not given a proportionate 
part of the shares distributed. Justice Chichester made the 
following statement in delivering the opinion of the court:
. When there are two kinds of stockholders, one preferred 
and the other common, when there is no difference in their status 
under the corporate charter except a preference as to dividends, 
and none under the statute law, the sale of stock to common 
stockholders at par, without giving the preferred stockholders an 
opportunity to purchase their proportionate part under the same 
conditions, or the issuance of a stock dividend to the common 
stockholders to the exclusion of the preferred stockholders, is an 
impairment of the rights of the latter which entitles them to relief 
in equity if the stock has not been delivered, or to damages for 
breach of a contract obligation if it has.”
The English rule that preferred stockholders are entitled to 
their contractual dividend and no more where there is no provi­
sion to the contrary has been carefully considered and solemnly 
adopted by several courts in the United States, as well as in 
England and by at least one court in Canada as the better view. 
Aside from authority, it is believed that it conforms more nearly 
to business notions than the other rule. The common stock­
holders expect to receive the greater share of the corporation’s 
profits. If it were not for this they would be unwilling to assume 
the risk involved in subscribing to common stock. To permit the 
holders of preferred stock to share pro rata in the surplus is to give 
them identical benefits for a smaller consideration because, on 
account of their stipulated dividend, they bear less risk than the 
common. It is highly unreasonable that the holders of the 
common stock should bear all the losses of lean years and that the 
preferred should enjoy pro rata the surplus earnings of prosperous 
years. The corporation grants the preference to the preferred 
stockholders in return for giving up the right to further dividends 
after the specified dividend has been paid. If participation is 
intended, it may be provided for by the contract. Absence of 
such provision should be construed as a denial of the right.
The participation rights of preferred stockholders, in the ab­
sence of a provision in the contract, is a question that has come 
before few of our state supreme courts. Since so few cases on the 
point have been adjudicated, it is uncertain what view any par­
ticular court will take of it, unless one of the precedents is, in the 
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opinion of the court, precisely in point and binding upon it. 
Since the English rule is supported by reason and by weight of 
authority in this country, in England and in Canada, it probably 
will be given careful consideration when the question arises in 
states that as yet have no precedents on the point.
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